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I Introduction 
It is only quite recent that也erelat10ns between the developed 
countnes reg血nedthe回terestof the International Relat10ns discipline. 
The 'oil crises' of 1973 and 1979, the growmg mtemal!onal role of West-
em Europe and Japan and certain mdicators for declining US 'impena! 
power’， demanded a redefinition of世田 interrelationsof Western indus-
trial countries. The development of summit diplomacy, mtensified mtra-
European political cooperation and strengthened cooperation血supra-
national泊stitut10nswere reflected in the concept of roughly tnangular 
US-Japan-EC relations supposedly being the dominating pattern of 
world economic relal!ons. Tnlateralism m the working of the四mmits 
and other cooperative ventures (e.g m OECD on policy coordinal!on, 
w1thm IMF to contain the monetary disorder, or泊 bilateraland GATT 
negotiations to reduce frictions担 traderelat10ns), however, should not 
conceal the fact that considerable potentials of conflict persist m rela-
tions among OECD countries. Orthodox Marxists e.g stil view these 
relat10ns as‘intra-impenahst nvalnes，川 wluchm terms of Lenin’s 
theory of凹1penalismare bound to lead to violent conflicts on the distri-
bution of overseas markets, resources and spheres of influence Follow-
ing dramatic contemporary media coverage, we might frequently assume 
that at least trade wars are ready at hand. 
What actually appears at stake is the capacity of the major血ter-
national actorsー inthe area of world economic relations these are again 
the US, the EC and Japan to limit and to regulate their occasional 
conflicts. In the developed world reduced growth rates, enduring massive 
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unemployment, the inability of most governments to steer their nat10nal 
economies properly and increased competition on由esupply of natural 
resources might inhibit the willingness of the trilateral actors to live up 
to the rules of international cooperation. The difficulties of EC叩 d
Japanese foreign policy making and those of也eUS to implement their 
international obligations are cases to血epoint. 
Under conditions of international stability -and these basically pre-
vailed in the 1960s皿d1970s -such deficiencies may not回usedramatic 
consequences Should, however，血isstability deteriorate (due to re-
source deplet10n, ecolog1cal, military, political turmotl or catastrophes), 
the fragtle framework of trilateral cooperation 1s likely to reach its 
limits 
Among trilateral relations the link between Europe and Japan doubt-
lessly 1s the weakest: Actually 1twould be more appropriate to teロn
what 1s now called a 'triangle’as an open angle, Europe -US and US -
Japan; only along these lmes exist substantial cultural exch四ge,com-
plementary trade relations and military alliances Jn analyzmg the EC’S 
policies towards Japan during the past decade -which nearly exclusively 
focused on bi・andmulttlateral negotiationsー 叩dm consideral!on of the 
relevant economic, institut10nal and attitudinal variables for EC-Japan 
relations, 1t will be possible to田tunatetheir structural deficiencies and 
to a田es condit10ns and policies for improvements towards a more 
durable trilateral reality. 
I The Economic Dimension of EC-Japan Relations 
EC-Japan trade did not reach significant proportions until the late 
1960s, when both in a way rediscovered each other, and expanded rapid-
ly thereafter. During that period Europe suddertly seemed to have 
become aware of Japan’s two-digit economic growth that appeared to 
head on undisturbed for the next decades towards Kalm’s‘叩perstate’－
m血血ehelp of the 1971 US import restrictions and Dollar devaluation 
Japan herself became conscious of the structural weakness of her de-
pendency on her m国nexport market, the US，四dfelt the need to 
diversify her export markets towards other developed countnes, among 
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them p出narilythe EC, which w白血enabout to enlarge. Soon, in 1972, 
Japan’s policy change showed more succe田 thanthe slower European 
response: her bilateral trade su中！usgrew to more than US $ 1 bio -sub-
sequently reducing the EC’s coverage ratio to les than 40%. This ratio 
remained roughly constant during the years to follow, though trade grew 
nominally by more th皿 500%(1970 1978). In 1978 the EC’s deficit 
reached US $6.6 bio: Japan exported for $11.5 bio to血eEC and im-
ported for $4.9 bio from there."' The decline of Japanese domestic 
demand due to the recession 1974/75 following the 01! crisis increased 
the u弔問cyto intensify overseas marketing and at the same tlme reduced 
the Community’s imports to Japan. German, French and Benelux sales 
fel by more than 20% (1974/75). It was then, when European indust-
rialists and policy-makers felt that a出en$3 bio Japanese trade surplus 
in a recession with 5 mio unemployed in the EC had reached the limits of 
tolerance. A Keidanren study mission headed by Mr. Doko tounng 
European capitals in October 1976 unexpectedly run into uniform 
European cntictsm.'" 
Japan then was caught in a dilemma: The US market was effectively 
barred for further substantial expansion of Japanese exports by pro tee-
tionist devices or their imminent threat, and most LDCs had to spend 
their valuta for energy bils. Apart from the Middle East, only OECD 
Europe offered a substantial and open market with signific叩 tpurchas加g
power. Japan now holds a 2.1% share in EC imports, while receiving 
0.9% of EC exports削 (1976).The EC’s share in Japan’s imports during 
that year was 5.6%, its share in Japan’s exports amounted to 10 8%. "'
Thus Japan depends far more on the Community as a source of supply 
and田 amarket出anthe Community does on Japan. 
Broken down countrywise, the concentration of Japanese exports on 
Germany and UK becomes apparent -Germany counts for 31 % and 
Britain for 21 % of Japan’s EC exports (1977). "' Germany and Britain 
also sel the bulk of EC exports to Japan (ag血 morethan 50%). 
Japanese exports to the EC are near exclusively composed of manu-
factured items, mostly transport, electrical, precision and general ma-
chinery. There is also a tendency towards more sophisticated machinery 
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and consumer products and a relative decline of light泊dustryor semi-
proce田edproducts (textJies, stel, chemicals）凹 Indifference to the US 
which to Japan exports high technology products (aviation, telecom-
mumcat10n, data processing equipment, etc.) and foodstuff and raw 
materials in exchange for Japanese products of也eintermediate techno-
logy level, such a complementary relati叩品ipdoes not exist in EC-Japan 
trade relations Both flows are dominated by products of the very same 
technology level回 Thestruc加reof Japan-EC trade is furtheraggravated 
by the unusually high degree .of sectoral concentration of Japanese ex-
ports to Europe.削 WheneverJapanese exports start to expand, problems 
m tenns of sudden mfluxes （‘invasions’） on very limited markets are the 
consequence. 
The most salient problems on EC markets due to concentrated Japa-
nese imports occurred on cars (resultmg in Japanese ‘voluntary’export 
restr血 tsto a 10%山田 onthe UK market), shipsσapan agreed on叩 t
backs in surplus production capacities泊 talkswithin OECD), on stel 
(there is a 1.4 mio t voluntary export ceiling to the EC sin田 1974）阻d
on ball bearings. Between 1974 and 1976 Japanese ball-bearings had in-
creased therr shares on EC markets from 1.2% to 16.8%. In February 
1977 the Commission加 posed阻加ti-dumping’levyof 20% (later 
reduced to 15%) on these products, which was the percentage the beanngs 
allegedly were sold cheaper in Europe than on the Japanese market. In 
March 1979 the European Court of Justice declared the levy 1月ustified
and asked for compensation .to血elfnporte日
Other sectoral disputes started on rapidly growmg Japanese market 
shares on a variety of electronic products. Imports of hi-fi equipment, 
TV sets and tubes after considerable p回目urefrom domes!Ic producers are 
now subject to voluntary export restraints to most Community countnes. 
On more recently developed consumer electronics and video equipment 
the s田nehas to be expected.醐
European exporters during most of the 1970s complained about a 
variety of deliberate Japanese import barriers, such as: restrictive quotas 
on footwear and processed agricultural products; on technical standards 
working as NTBs and lengthy testing procedures on cars, chemical and 
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pharrnaceullcal products already tested in Europe, dilatory customs 
clearance and registration procedures; a distribution system, either 
selling European products as luxury items with high mark-ups, thus 
preventing bulk sales, or being loyal to domestic manufacturers and 
therefore discriminatmg against foreign 町1porters，‘admirustrahve
guid叩 Cぜbarring回目山 hightechnology imports in order to protect 
Japan’s own infant technology production; d1scrumnatory taxes on 
liquor阻 dwme；血elike treatment of cigarette imports by the Japanese 
State monopoly; restrictive tanffs on biscuits, confectionary processed 
food and certain machinery and chemical products; and the general‘buy 
Japanese' attitude of Japanese authorities, manufacturers, trading com-
panies and wholesalers 
In the me阻 tunemost of the administrative NTBs have been removed 
As a consequence of the Tokyo Round Japanese industnal tarifs will 
fal below EC level. Most quotas except those on footwear and most 
proce田edfoodstuff一havebeen either enlarged or removed. With the 
mcreased Japanese propensity to import manufactured items and a 
slowly narrowing trade deficit vis-a-vis the EC m 1979, bilateral trade 
relations for the first time smce 1975 are headmg towards detente. 
Japan’s balance on services and transfers to也eEC is traditionally 
deficitanan The bulk of Japan’s payments for mvisibles goes to London’s 
City (1978・$1,458mio) for maritune transportation, insurance, over-
seas travel and mvestment incomes. Most of this amount, however, is 
transferred to帥 dcountnes for田mces(e.g. marihme transportahon) 
only mediated by the City."' 
In Japan’s long term capital account again more th叩 50%of her 
transfers to Europe went to UK, most of it for direct investments, then 
trade credits, loans, securities and external bonds."' Cumulated Japa-
m田 investments加血eEC (1951～1977) totaled to $2,700 mio (12.1% 
。fJapan’s foreign investment). $1,690 mio of it were invested in UK, 
mostly, however, in oil compames with ortly the head office in London 
(such as the Abu Dhabi Marine Area CoふTherest is devoted mainly to 
commercial investments (b阻king,insurance, marketing), leavmg some 
10% to manufacturmg " Wi血 increasingthreats of protectionism, 
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rismg wage levels m Japan and the appreciation of the Yen in the past 
years, the share of manufacturing investments is likely to increase. These 
inves師団n臼 arehighly welcome by European governments, with par-
ticular efforts to attract it from Japan being done by the Insh叩 d
Belgi四 s,since Japanese investors have shown strong sensitivity to 
reg10nal needs and incenllve schemes in choosing production sites-most-
ly in Ireland in the European periphery. 
European direct mvesllnents m Japan rem田nquite msigmficant and 
remain well below Japanese levels in Europe. It was only 1973 when 
Japan liberalized her tight restnctions on capital imports. Since then -due 
to Japan’s high wage levels foreign investments tended to be concen-
trated on commercial叩dbanking establishments. As far as manufactur-
ing investments are concerned preferred European schemes are to ac司uire
minority interests in existing corporations or to establish joint ven-
tures in Japan.'"' In 1975 Japan maintained 5500 trade offices in the 
EC, while EC corporat10ns kept 1500 offices in Japan." These invest-
ments in the distribution sector may serve as an indicator for differentials 
m the intensity of世田marketingefforts. On technological cooperat10n 
already since the mid-60s its most sigmficant scheme is run between the 
EC and Japan. It concerns the reprocessing of spent Japanese nuclear 
fuels at French and Bril!sh plants, and the return of血eplutonium 
recovered to Japan. Because of the controls imposed by the US 1978 
Non-Proliferation Act and the ‘technical difficulties' encountered during 
reprocessing these ventures have, however, recently become somewhat 
inhibited.回 Smallercooperative projects concern ocean research, coal 
hydration皿daviation technology. 
il The European Community’S Foreign Po hey Making 
There are two ways of viewing出eEC: One is to perceive its imp res-
sive statistical features with the combmed economic strength of the four 
leading Western European powers and to view its common agricultural 
pohc児島 regionalpolicies, common external tarif, foreign economic 
policy cooperation, the European Monetary System, etc. as achievements 
of the world’s so far most ambit10us and successful voluntary regional 
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integration scheme. The other and certainly the prevalent view among 
the European public and academics is to stress the EC's shortcomings, its 
stagnation between integrat10n, d1sintegrat10n and intergovernmental-
ism師 andthe record of broken promises by the European heads of 
government, such as to achieve the Monetary and Economic Union by 
1980. 
It may therefore be useful to introduce the concept of a‘coalition' 
（“a temporary combination between part！自由atre凶ndistinctive 
pnnciples”）叫 toexplain血epresent half-way s阻gnationof European 
integrat10n as well as the EC's foreign policy behavior. Both the EC’s 
external relations and the member states’‘Europe叩 PoliticalCoopera-
ti on’on‘刷出 politics’issues(while the EC’S Commission deals with 
external 'low politics', such as trade and other economic questions) 
姐lustratesthe working of a coalition of national bureaucracies pur田ing
iomtly their separate national interests only for the very mo世間 that
these cannot be achieved successfully in ISolated attemp臼，帥 thisme阻s
e.g・asubstantially increased potential of international bargaining lever-
age 
In order to enable the free circulation of capital and trade withm the 
Community in 1970 a Common External Tariff (CET) was implemented. 
This CET then functionally requ江eda common commercial policy of 
the member states to deal with吐由dcountries bilaterally or in multi-
lateral negol!at10ns Among血eCommunity msl!tutions the CommISsion 
was formally put in charge of the conduct of the EC’s external relation 
In its actions and policies, however, the Commiss10n contmues to depend 
upon the Council of Ministers approval (which on fo日ignpolicy issues is 
made up by the nine foreign m1msters. A more decisive body 1s the 
‘European Council’ the meeting of nine heads of government, an msti-
tution established as sup田meCommunity msl!tut10n in 1974). The 
Councils’meetings are the institut10n where Community and national 
interests have to be reconciled-due to nahonal veto powers in m句or
Council decisions, however，世田 firstusually suffer. This fundamental 
dependence of the Commission on frequently conflicting national policy 
interests constitutes its major flaw as an mtemational actor. The per-
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m組問tneed to deal with dominant crosspressures and to compromise 
with nationalist anti-EC sentunent m the member states, prevents long-
teロnonented EC external polici田， l!esthe Commission to吐ieCom-
munity's smallest c。mmondenominator and frustrates its pe日onnel.
Quite similar to Japan’s internat10nal negotiating behavior the inter-
nat10nal bargaimng posit10ns of the Commission have to be elaborated 
as complex compromises and are therefore ra也erinflexible during nego-
tiations. Taking mto account出e‘coalition’characterof the European 
Commumty, the Conumssion constantly has to worry about the cohesion 
of its nine member states. Should domestic economic problems increase 
then the attractivity of the Italian exainple is likely to rise, i.e to resort 
unilaterally to import restnctions whenever the need arises. The com-
plex1ty of its inner struc加reand its decision making process makes the 
EC internationally a very difficult negotiating partner醐 Inaddition, its 
political leadership the European Councilー isso weak due to its chronic 
disunity that it may prove difficult to resist protectionist pressures 
effectively In this sense the fragile and reversible character of the 
European Community forrnmg the world’s largest trading blockー 即位t
well threaten the survival of the present international economic system. 
The negotiations with Japan could well be one of the most crucial tests 
In the medium term future after the EC’s second enlargement, the 
membership of Greece, Spain, Portugal and eventually Turkey, al with 
relative deficiencies in their economic structures will strengthen protec-
tionist p回目ure.Then a strong m句orityof tradit10nally more protec-
tionist countnes will face the only two hard-core ‘free traders' left: 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
N The Cultural Perception of Japan in Europe 
In international relations the mutual perceptions of nations play a 
decisive role Though the populat10ns are usually effectively excluded 
from most foreign policy decisions, their attitudes may ei吐ierbe shared 
or at least taken mto account by the decisive policy makers. 
Among a s副npleof 5000 respondents in five EC countnes Gallup血
1978 explored mass attitudes towards Japan and on EC-Japanese rela-
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lions凶 Amonglists of attributes on Japan those who chose only pos1-
tive answers (beautiful, peaceful, high cultural standard, etc.) were 50% in 
Italy and Germany, 46% m Britain, 40% in Fr叩 ce叩 d35% m Belgium. 
Fifteen percent of respondents gave only negative an駄wers (difficult to 
understand, polluted, low wages, etc.) in Britain and France, 12% in 
Belgium, 11 % in Italy and 8% in Germany.,. When they were asked to 
characterize Japanese people 65% of Europeans chose posillve an問問
only, while 2% used only negative answers闘 Onquest10ns aumng at 
actual knowledge on Japan, 51% could answer that free elections were 
held in Japan, only 26% knew由atJapan is alied to the US while keep-
ing her own army阻 d19% knew Japan’S policies on nuclear non-arma-
ment. The relative levels of knowledge are consistently higher in Ger-
many and Italy，血eyare the least.in Belgium.凶
Thirty-five percent of European respondents thmk of their trade de-
ficit towards Japan as nothmg unusual, 48% want it redressed as soon as 
po田ible-40＇.品 ofthem prefer import restrictions and 44% increased 
export efforts to Japan." Twenty-nine percent consider Japan as an 
economic nval and threat to the EC, however 45% believe that agree-
ments or cooperation面 pa巾 ershipare possibleれJK:53%, Germany: 
50%, Italy: 48%, France: 45%, Belgium: 31%）.岡
Comp a口nga UK poll of 1967-when about 34% in a Gallup sample 
showed anti-Japanese attitudes," and a F田nchpoll (1969) when only 
37% believed Japan to be a democratic country四（1978:47%), with 
the 1978 survey, a considerable improvement of the Japanese image in 
Europe together with raised levels of mfoロnationbecomes apparent. 
Findings of a 1973 poll in Germany, when 85% of the respondents con-
sidered Germ町トJapaneserelations as good or very good, seem not to 
have varied substantially醐
As sources of mformation on Japan 2% of EC citizens cite personal 
travels to Japan, 4% have Japanese friends, 4% visited exhib1t10ns on 
Japan, 9% saw related cmema movies, 9% mention educational ins ti加－
tions, 10% conversatrons, 66% the printed media (books, newspapers, 
magazines）阻d65% TV and radio.岡 The1969 French survey supports 
thIS findmg of the overridmg significance of the mass media as the pr加 e
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source of information on Japan.回
Actually only 0.05% of EC citizens do annually travel to Jap叩，stay-
ing an average of 15 days and spending 86% of it in the k皿toor Kansal 
area. 147,000 visited Japan in 1977, most of them British (43%) and 
German 仰%）.In the same year more出anone mtllion Japanese toured 
EC countries most frequently Fr皿ceand Italy ο35 ,000 each）.回
From these data on intercultural perceptions and contacts we may 
conclude・ An 'ugly Japanese' hnage inspite of four years of trade con-
flrcts does not exist in Europe. The ideal typical Japan perception rs 
rather characterized by a somewhat mdifferent benevolence. A large 
m句orityprofesses exclusively positive images of Japan and the Japanese, 
which are, however, sustained by litle actual knowledge or personal 
contacts. It could therefore be easily m回 ipulated.As far as attitudes 
towards the trade conflict are concernedー thougha relative majonty 
either does not seem to care or at least dislikes drastic steps to be taken 
against Japan -the frequent intra-EC trade conflicts show that irrespec-
tive of generally good neighborly feehngs, these do not prevent European 
populations to milit四tlydefend their economic .interests once they are 
perceived as threatened by outside intrusions. The then (1978) rather 
relaxed attitude therefore indicates that由eEC-Japan trade dispute 
was rightly assessed as qmte marginal for the EC’s overall econom¥c 
perform四 ce.
Broken down nationally, Germany and Italy appear to have the most 
positrve perception of Japan This could either correspond to hrgl悶
levels of knowledge on Japan there or to stronger identifications due to 
sumlar fates m contemporary history The percentage of people resent-
加EJapanese in none of the countries investigated exceeded 4%, which is 
the usual level of xenophobes m most socretres anyway. Due to the lack 
of data, the attitude of Dutch people today c町田otbe properly assessed. 
The Netherlands were the only country in Europe in 1971 where也e
Emperor’S visit provoked massive demonstrations commemorating the 
suffering of Dutch civtlians during the Japanese warthne occupat10n of 
the East Indies回
The sources of informations indicate that 96% of EC nat10nals never 
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had any meaningful communication with Japanese-and曲目 atleast 
71 % solely depend on the media for reinforcement or actual shapmg of 
their attitudes towards Japan. This illustrates the influence of the 63 EC 
foreign correspondents in Tokyo叫 onthe minds of their 260 mio EC 
fellow countrymen. 
By al further available data the notion of a one-way channel of com-
munication from Europe to Japan is supported There were 6021 (1971-
73) translations from EC languages into Japan （出oughmost of it is likely 
to be US product10n), while in the EC 108 Japanese books were trans-
lated {1971-73）.悶 Whilein 1975, 268 EC students studied at Japanese 
universities, 2,573 Japanese students studied at umvers1ties in the EC.国
There are twice as m叩yJapanese diplomats m EC countries than vice 
versa, and six times as many Japanese technicians, sales-and business-
men聞 Jnterms of residence, about three times more Japanese live m 
the EC than the other way. Similar one-sided interests are reflected m 
the frequency of mutual newscoverage and in academic research activi-
ties. In Europe, in addition, academic teaching on Japan is largely con-
fined to classical and literature oriented Japanology departments. There 
1s hardly any Political Science, Economics, History or Sociology depart-
men! pursuing research on Japan Jn the US which are usually assumed 
to be culturally more泊trospecl!vethan Europeー thissituatwn appears 
far better by comparison. The fault for the one-way (non-) commum四－
tion pattern is not entirely due to European ethnocentrism or indiffer-
ence. There is also a conspicuous lack of Japanese mterest to dissemmate 
knowledge on her contemporary culture abroad. Apart from ndiculously 
small quotas for foreign students and posts for foreign academics in 
Japanese umvers1t1es or the frequently described ‘clannishness’of her 
citizens abroad, the governmental budgets for the cultural self-presenta-
l!on abroad may se四eas a valid mdicator for intended policies: In 1971 
Japan spent 800 mio Yen for her cultural presentation abroad, Britain: 
7 8 b10 Yen, Germany 32 bio Yen and France 63 b10 Yen.叩
V The Trade Negotiations EC-Japan 
During the EC’s transitional penodー lastinguntil 1970 contacts to 
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Japan on foreign economic policies were near exclusively kept on a 
national btlateral level. When m 1955 Japan acceded to GATT, France, 
Britain and血eBenelux invoked Art. XXXV to withhold Most Favored 
Nation treatment from Japan. This was then considered as a precaution 
ag剖nstthose cheap Japanese imports which Europe had experienced m 
the pre-war penod, when Japan supposedly sold watches m kilograms 
When later bilateral trade ag田emen臼（1960/63)were concluded 
between these countries and Japan, MFN treatment was granted to Japan 
m exchange for the inclusion of safeguard clauses (which allow to uni-
laterally問stnctsectorally damaging imports after an extensive consulta-
llon procedure). When Germany and Italy, who had not mvoked Art 
XXXV GATT ag血nstJapan, negotiated trade agreements, Japan refused 
to grant safeguard clauses. 
Later in 1970, when the establishment of the customs umons with 
its common external tanff required a common EC trade pohcy towards 
Japan, this lack of a uniform 回目eguardprovision in bilateral q田ements
developed into a senous diplomatic obstacle. In 1969-71 dunng negolla-
lions on a common trade agreement with Japan, Japan refused to extend 
the safeguards to Italy and Germany, the latter being her most import四 t
market in Europe. The EC, bound by the Council of Ministers mandate, 
msllsted on its inclusion, and when Commissioner Dalrrendorf soundeiJ 
out a mutually acceptable compromise of safeguards lunited m time, 
region and scope, French intransigence醐 forcedthe postponement of 
the conclus10n of a Japan ・ECtrade agreement until after the then 
planned Tokyo Round During the Tokyo Round, however, Japan’sand 
血eNIC’S msistence on a universal (i.e. non-discriminatory) safeguard for-
mula prevented the‘updated’revision of GATT’s safe田岨rdprocedure, 
as planned by the EC and the US: the issue of safeguards discriminat担g
only the originating country of troublesome exports was shelved and stil 
awaits for resolution. Consequently the condition for reopening talks on 
a Japan -EC trade agreement has not yet been fulfilled，四dEC -Japan 
trade remains based upon annually renewed national bilateral trade 
agreements 
Reflecting the grow加gimportance of actual trade flows of白cialcom-
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mu凶cationchannels have developed in recent years. Since June 1973 
high level consultat10ns between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the 
Commission are held semiannually m Brussels and Tokyo In November 
1974 the EC opened its Delegation in Tokyo. At the same time mutual 
visits of both Commissioner and Mmister level occurred frequently in 
both capitals. 
The circumstances of the Keidanren mission's shocked encounter of 
European criticism in October 1976 have already been mentioned. They 
indicated the beginning of a somet1m田 evenslightly dramatic trade 
conflict In any case, as a result of血e‘Dokoshokku’the Comm1Ss10n 
seemed to have won its first aly in Japan: the Keidanren announced to 
henceforth consider certain voluntary export restr剖ntsand increased 
manufactured imports from Europe necessary.柵
With the worsening of the bilateral trade situation, official relations 
also were affected. In November 1976 the Commission th田atenedto 
switch to‘hard line' tactics, i.e. to consider the凹 positionof trade 
restricti。ns,should the bilateral balance of trade not improve 
European Council in November 1976 and March 1977 expressed its con 
－ cem on the problems caused by sectorally concentrated町1portsfrom 
Japan and urged the Commission to step up its efforts to pe四uadethe 
Japanese government to both open Japan’s market 1. e. by enlarged 
quotas for foodstuff and the removal of NTBs on industrial products and 
to agree to accept more self-restraint agreements on sensitive items (stel, 
electronics, ca白血dships）ー同 Startingwith Mr. Ushiba’s (Mimster for 
External Economic Affairs) visit to Brussels in December 1977 a series of 
more intensified negotiations developed. They finally led to a joint 
statement by Commiss10ner Haferkamp and Mr. Ushiba on desirable 
commercial and macro economic policies to alleviate血epersisting 
imbalance,'" issued in March 1978. The virtual emptyness of血ejoint 
statement was considered by most observers as a Japanese diplomatic 
victory. Japan had successfully withstood three months of intense 
bargaining pressureー 阻dfinally was able to settle for the reiterat10n 
of her usual assurance the current account deficit would be visibly 
reduced in about s皿monthstime due to the more or l回sself-regulatory 
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change of some external or macro economic variables刷 TheEuropean 
Council m April 1978也enevaluated the statement only as a官rststep’ 
of continumg negotiatmg efforts. At the Bonn summit in July 1978泊
order to avoid public criticism也eFukuda government pledged to 
釦rtherliberalize rmports, to stimulate domestic demand by fiscal pohcies 
副mingat a 7% growth and to double her development aid 1977-80.同
When neither the trade balance improved during 1978 nor the growth 
pledge appeared to be taken seriously by the Japanese authorities, and 
a further high-level consultation round brought no substantial chang田，
the Commission apphed some mnoval!ve tactics. A strongly worded 
‘internal' report evaluating the EC's past negotiating perform皿 ceand 
Japanese policy responses was le泊由dto the press. It soon made head-
lines due to its reference to Japanese ‘workaholics’， livmg担‘rabbit
hutches’叩dother displays of British humour. More s1gnificantly,how-
ever, the memo recommends to apply import controls (likely candidates 
being electromcs and cars) on Japanese imports. Moreover the report 
criticises the prior EC soft （‘polite’） line as showing only ‘meager’re四l臼，
1t then lists broken Japanese promises dunng the past years of negotia-
tion on economic growth, trade su中！usreduction, expansion of ODA 
and GATT conce田ions 百四回portfmally criticises the member govem-
men tswhom as the Japanese ‘openly boast' they can play against each 
other.同 Theleak of this memo was properly timed to scare the Japa-
nese au出ontieswho were busily planmng a harmonous outcome for the 
approaching Tokyo summit. 
As an町田iediateresponse the Japanese cabinet in May 1979 decided 
to streamline standards and tests for imported goods, and hinted 1t would 
also abolish the discretionary power of local authorities to approve or 
disapprove of some products -this usually had worked strongly in favor 
of local producers帥 Withthe discovery of Japan’s current account 
balance turning into a sustained deficit since mid 1979, the heartpiece of 
EC demands an overall balance of Japan’s external trade -found a 
sudden and unforeseen fulfillment. 
As a response the Commission -endorsed by the European Council in 
June 1979-endorsed a 'new strategy', which should reflect bothappre-
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ciation for Japanese concessions and at the s田netime demand for a 
further reduction of restrictions 裕司nstforeign加ports(e.g. on pro-
ce田edfoodstuff and footwe町）．百ie‘newstrategy’puts new emphasis 
on hitherto neglected potentials of cooperation: on mdustrial policies 
(by two-way investments, JOrnt ventures on third markets,in industry to 
industry consultations), on monetary policies, on energy-and research 
policies and on policies for development."' 
Three years after the Doko mi田ion:finally the lingering EC -Japan 
quarrels seem to have reached叩 end-for the t町田beingat least. 
VI Conclusions 
I The tardyness of both Japanese and EC decision makmg and the 
relative lack of European bargaining leverage (as compared to the US) 
drew out the trade dispute unnece田arily,thus increasing the potential 
for an eventual escalation. St辺l,the EC’s policies towards Japan m副距
tained by and large its declared obiectlve of unrestncted trade with 
Japan vis-i-vis protect10nist pressu問S(apart from the ballbeanng 
'dumping’charge in 1977). 
2 G!Ven血ede島nsivestructure of Japan’s trade mterests (while the EC 
pursued a diplomatic ‘offensive’） the slow Japanese responsivene田 on
foreign policy issues -usually interpreted as weakness同一ledto a 
Japanese diplomatic victory. She withstood most pr田sures（血eonly 
painful concess10n being the reduction of Japan’s shipyard capacities), 
and only gradually opened her markets to the levels of developed 
countries. This happened only after Japan extensively assured herself 
that no harm could be done to her economic struc加reby manu-
factured imports and by concedmg this overdue opening m exchange 
for the accumulation of high trade surpluses vis-i-vis Europe and the 
us. 
3 G!Ven her strong military回deconomic dependence to the US,Japan 
in her economic policies clearly values her relations to the US higher 
than those to the EC (though Japan also depends more on EC markets 
血相 viceversa). The US’arms-twisting tactics in negotiations with 
Japan therefore could yield more substantial concess10ns白血 the
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EC’s soft line. This success, however, does not unply that a European 
imitat10n of the US hard line would achieve similar results. 
4. In terms of intercultural perceptions Europeans display a strong 
sympathy towards Japan. Tlus is an a田etso far untapped by the 
Japanese which have made no real effort to dissemmate her con-
temporary culture m Europe nor have Europeans themselves felt the 
mclination to make efforts to alleviate their ignorance and to establish 
a me四ingful阻 dextensive two-way communication with Japan. A 
side effect of the trade dispute was that there were nearly five years of 
bad publicity for Japan加 theEuropean media. This was a period 
during which the media’s‘Japan theme' of ‘economic miracle' was 
thorou悼lyrevised towards‘economic animal' If endunng, the 
European public's unage of Japan could well change towards this 
stereotype 
5. Generally positive attitudes towards Japan do not prevent the Euro-
pe叩 publicto support concerned domestic producers' demands for 
restrictions on Japanese or other imports 1f they are perceived as 
harmful to domestic product10n and employment. Japanese exporters 
therefore should display more sensitivity than m the past when 
penetrating European marketsおrthe ‘second round' of the Japanese 
export drive -expected to happen in the 1980s on wide range of 
highly sophisticated, technology intensive products which are market-
able only on the European and North American markets 
6. In order to co山l!erthe crunches of the 1980s and also to enable 
tnlateralism, the nece田arycooperation of the m句ordeveloped 
countnes, policies which might be termed as‘Joint preventive crisis 
m叩 agement'are needed to govern Japan-EC relations. Such policy 
recommendations may be summed up as folows・ 
L Economic policies: 
-a sustamed opening of the Japanese market, 
-a more sensitive approach to EC markets, 
-strengthened cooperatJve patterns. 
2. Institutional reform: 
the rea田町t10nof political leadership m血eEC, 
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the streng血e凶ngof Community oriented dec1S10n m誌血gin・ 
the Councils, 
-a faster responsiveness of Japan’s foreign policies町1da stronger 
awareness of her international responS1btl1ties 
3. Attitudmal changes: 
-European learning from Japan, 
-ertlarged two咽 aycommunication channels between Europe and 
Japan, 
effort芯towardsbetter Japanese pubhcity in Europe 
7 In any case, it should be kept in mind, should new cnses reoccur 
and higher Japanese compel!l!veness threaten cert血nEuropean 
industnes：“Cette r~gle du jeu n'est pas japonaise c’est la r色gledu jeu 
de la concur日ncecap1taliste’＼醐
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